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Revisiting the Paris Declaration agenda—an inclusive, realistic orientation 
for aid effectiveness 
 
 
Abstract 
The progress in endeavours to achieve the commitments of the Paris Declaration on Aid 
Effectiveness has been slow. This paper explains the challenges faced by the aid 
effectiveness agenda and discusses why and how it needs to be revisited. In order to 
elucidate the differences in donors’ approaches to aid effectiveness, a comparison is 
made between the United Kingdom and Japan, which leads to two suggestions. The 
main messages are that it is important to be inclusive of different donors, and to link 
the policy dialogue and reality on the ground. 
 
Key words: Official Development Assistance, Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 
Japan, United Kingdom 
 
 
Page 18 of 35
URL: http:/mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cdip  Email: developmentinpractice@intrac.org
Development in Practice
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Introduction 
 
The proliferation of sources of donor aid has been an issue for a long time. In Tanzania, 
it was reported that 2,000 uncoordinated aid projects from 40 donors were undermining 
the capacity of the government (Helleiner 1995); therefore, a strong need for donor 
coordination became evident. Since the early 2000s, international action has been taken 
to address this issue, mainly led by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of 
the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): The Rome 
High-Level Forum on Harmonization was held in 2003, followed by another High Level 
Forum in 2005, at which the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness was endorsed. The 
Paris Declaration, signed by more than 100 countries, international organisations, and 
non-governmental organisations, set out five partnership commitments between the 
donors and developing countries: ownership, alignment, harmonisation, managing for 
results, and mutual accountability. The goal is to change the ways in which donor aid is 
delivered by putting the developing countries at the centre and aligning donors’ aid with 
the structure of the administrative systems of the developing countries. Under the five 
commitments, twelve measurable indicators were agreed upon to monitor the progress 
of the commitments. For instance, targets include halving the proportion of aid flows to 
the government sector which are not reported in governments’ budgets (under 
alignment), and ensuring 40% of donor missions are jointly conducted (under 
harmonisation). As such, through the collective efforts by both donors and the 
developing countries, the Paris Declaration aims to reduce the transaction costs 
imposed on the developing countries. 
 
While the aid effectiveness agenda has changed the way in which donors provide aid for 
increased ownership of and partnership with the developing countries, the recent 
monitoring survey on the Paris Declaration (OECD 2008) reports that the pace of 
progress has been slow, and, therefore, it urges further collective efforts in achieving the 
targets. Most of the academic literature on the Paris Declaration points out some 
structural bottlenecks embedded in it, and these bottlenecks are understood as the 
reasons for the slow implementation of the Declaration. Rogerson (2005) points out that 
without real penalties for non-compliance, like any collective action, the aid 
effectiveness agenda is vulnerable to failure; therefore, he proposes that accountability 
devices to assess and rate donors’ performance be put in place. Andersen and 
Therkildsen (2007) indicate that promoting budget support and decentralisation of aid 
administration may not easily lead to the reduction of transaction costs and increase of 
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local ownership as assumed in the Paris Declaration because it depends on the 
country-specific context in terms of donor–recipient interests, incentives, and altruism. 
Barder (2009) argues that the Paris Declaration is substantially dominated by the 
‘planning’ mindset, and that the aid system needs to be reformed, supported by other 
institutional approaches such as ‘markets’ and ‘networks’ for coordinating multiple 
actors with diverse and competing interests. Hyden (2008), by analysing the Tanzanian 
situation through the concept of power, cautions that the harmonisation and ownership 
are not always compatible and that understanding the political realities in developing 
countries is the real challenge for donors. The common issues underlined in the existing 
literature are that the rigid planned policy of the Paris Declaration should be 
supplemented by other approaches, and political economic insight needs to be taken 
into account at both the policy and implementation levels. 
 
This paper will first explain the emerging challenges that the Paris Declaration is faced 
with, which account for the reasons for slow implementation of the Declaration. 
Although one of the fundamental purposes of the Paris Declaration is to reduce the 
transaction costs of the government, this paper questions the successful realisation of 
reducing such costs; because donors’ harmonisation and alignment efforts often go 
beyond the optimal level, the transaction costs problem at the country level remains to 
be solved. While the progress on the Paris Declaration has been slow, other actors such 
as non-DAC donors have increasingly begun to gain influence in the changing 
international aid architecture, which has strong implications for DAC donors, who are 
the majority of the signatories of the Paris Declaration. The following section will 
examine the incentives and obstacles for donors in adopting and implementing the aid 
effectiveness agenda based on a comparative analysis of the United Kingdom (UK) and 
Japan. Analysing the two different donors will add value to the existing literature on 
the Paris Declaration in understanding donors’ bottlenecks for implementing the 
Declaration. The final section proposes some suggestions for a way forward toward an 
inclusive and realistic orientation for the aid effectiveness agenda. 
 
  
Challenges facing the aid effectiveness agenda  
 
One of the issues underlying the Paris Declaration is whether it has reduced the 
transaction costs of governments through the donors’ effort for harmonisation and 
alignment. The difficulty and complexity of precisely measuring transaction costs is 
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reported in a recent study evaluating the transaction costs of implementing the Paris 
Declaration (Lawson 2009), while other studies (Killick 2004; Batley 2005) show that 
the new aid modalities, such as Programme-Based Approaches (PBAs) do not reduce, 
but rather increase, transaction costs accrued to the government.(1) While recognising 
the difficulty of measuring transaction costs, nonetheless, this paper argues that 
governments are still busy dealing with donors, especially in countries where an aid 
effectiveness agenda has been introduced rapidly. Ideally, through the different levels of 
meetings (from the ambassador level to the technical level) and different kinds of 
meetings (such as those of sector working groups or thematic coordination groups), 
donors should coo dinate themselves so that the governments’ time and costs for 
dealing with donors are reduced. However, the frequency of the meetings often goes 
beyond the optimal level, probably because there is no consensus on what would be 
‘optimal’, which means that the donors who perceive the optimal level to be higher than 
other donors do tend to act radically. More importantly, these meetings usually require 
governments to attend or be involved in order to share information and have policy 
dialogue with the donors. For instance, the recently proposed new dialogue structure in 
Tanzania shows that under the joint coordination group and Public Expenditure Review 
working group, there are 10 sectors and 10 thematic groups, which are categorised into 
4 working groups, where more than 10 ministries of the Tanzanian government take 
part as members of each sector and thematic group.(2) This shows the complexity of the 
aid coordination mechanism at the country level and the intensity of government 
involvement in it. Furthermore, there are risks that might lead to the creation of two 
dialogue tracks: in addition to the formal joint coordination mechanism, donors 
continue to communicate with the government bilaterally below the surface, especially 
when it comes to critical issues.(3) The increased pressure to attend and respond to 
many coordination meetings is incentivised by international aid policy from the outside; 
once the policy is agreed to internationally, the government and donors in the 
developing country tend to demonstrate, and sometimes exaggerate, their performance 
against the agreed-upon agenda in order to be recognised as having achieved success. 
Such an incentive could often be understood as the cause of harmonisation and 
alignment going beyond the optimum level.  
 
Another emerging challenge is the dramatically changing international aid architecture 
in recent years, which has significant implications for the aid effectiveness agenda. 
While DAC donors committed to the Paris Declaration to varying degrees, development 
assistance activities of other actors, such as non-DAC donors or private foundations, are 
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increasingly having an impact on developing countries.(4) Because the Paris 
Declaration aims to provide a government with a comprehensive overview of donors’ 
activities within its country, the existence of the actors outside the framework means 
that the DAC donors’ collective efforts are undermined. However, ironically, the more 
the emerging countries, most of whom are non-DAC donors, gain stronger voices and 
more power in the global economy, the less likely it is that they will be motivated to be 
involved in the Paris Declaration. Woods (2008) calls this surge of emerging countries a 
‘silent revolution’ and explains that the emerging donors are introducing competitive 
pressures into the existing system by quietly offering alternatives to aid-receiving 
countries. They are indeed offering alternatives. For instance, non-DAC donors are 
often criticised by DAC donors because their aid is different and far from DAC 
standards. In general, it is said that the purpose of non-DAC donors’ aid is inclined to 
political motivation or resource diplomacy, which the DAC donors view as undermining 
developmental and poverty-reduction effects. An increased volume of loans to African 
countries is reportedly being injected by emerging donors such as China; this is seen as 
free-ride behaviour by DAC donors, who have concerns about the debt sustainability of 
African countries, especially because their debts were relieved by international 
initiative during the 2000s. On the other hand, the non-DAC donors’ aid is more often 
than not welcomed by either governments or political leaders, especially in Africa, 
resulting in the weakening relative power of the DAC donors. One reason of this might 
be that non-DAC donors do not attach conditionality, especially on governance issues, 
based on the principle of non-interference. Ironically, this contrasts with the recent 
suspension or reduction of budget support by several DAC donors in countries such as 
Uganda, Ethiopia, and Rwanda because of governance-related conditionality, which 
turned out to be undermining the predictability and ownership of those countries.(5) 
Another reason is that as DAC donors’ aid has shifted toward the social sector, 
non-DAC donors’ aid has gone to the underfunded sectors, such as infrastructure or 
production, which also matches the needs of the recipient countries. Non-DAC donors 
are providing alternatives which DAC donors are not able to offer. 
 
As has been shown, while the donors’ harmonisation effort of the Paris Declaration does 
not result in reducing the transaction costs of the recipient government, the increasing 
influence of non-DAC donors’ aid activities exposes DAC donors to emerging pressure to 
reflect their own practice. It is necessary to revisit the current aid effectiveness agenda 
so that a more inclusive and comprehensive framework for donor cooperation can be 
realised. While this section explained ‘why’ the aid effectiveness agenda needs to be 
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revisited, the following sections will compare the aid effectiveness approaches of the UK 
and Japan in order to show ‘how’ it should be revisited. 
 
 
Comparison of aid effectiveness approaches by the UK and Japan 
 
Progress in implementing the Paris Declaration varies among the donors. Table 1 shows 
the Paris Declaration monitoring survey indicators for the UK and Japan in 2005 and 
2007. By and large, the UK performs better than Japan. It is widely recognised that the 
UK has been a frontrunner in leading the aid effectiveness agenda, while Japan follows 
after the frontrunners. While there’s no space for arguing that Japan needs to make its 
own effort for aid effectiveness, observations as to why Japan has been regarded as a 
follower and what makes it difficult for Japan to move ahead toward the aid 
effectiveness agenda have useful implications for successful implementation of the 
agenda, especially since the number of new aid actors is increasing. 
 
<Table 1> 
 
Over the last decade, the UK has been leading the international aid discourse on 
poverty reduction and the aid effectiveness agenda. After the Labour Party took power 
in 1997, the Department for International Development (DFID) was created and the 
White Paper on International Development, ‘Eliminating World Poverty: A challenge 
for the 21st Century’, was published in the same year.(6) The main objective of the 
DFID is to work for the world’s poor to achieve the Millennium Development Goals 
(MDGs), and this is clearly directed by the legislation of the International Development 
Act introduced in 2002. As such, an institutional setting exists that is clearly led by the 
political leadership in the UK government toward aid effectiveness. Based on such an 
institutional and political strength, the UK plays a key role in advocating for and 
influencing other countries. For instance, Ms. Clare Short, who served as Secretary of 
State for International Development between 1997 and 2003, was in a core position in 
contributing to lead the international aid agenda. In 1999, she formed the Utstein 
Group together with other ministers in charge of development from Germany, Norway, 
and the Netherlands in order to drive the international development agenda forward, 
including aid effectiveness. The aim of the group was to implement an international 
consensus on development in a concerted way on various issues ranging from 
peace-building to corruption.(7) The new aid modalities, such as PBAs and budget 
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support under the aid effectiveness agenda, were developed and led by interest groups 
such as the Utstein Group. The Like-Minded Group, comprising mainly the Nordic 
countries and the UK, served the same purpose. These allied groups formed a consensus 
on accelerating the aid effectiveness agenda, and by utilising such forums, the UK 
successfully disseminated its initiative and extended influence over other countries. 
This strong political leadership was a critical element of the UK becoming a frontrunner 
in the implementation of the aid effectiveness agenda. 
 
How has the aid effectiveness agenda influenced Japan? During the 1990s, Japan 
enjoyed the status of the largest Official Development Assistance (ODA) donor among 
the DAC countries; from the late 1990s, however, Japan’s ODA budget started to shrink. 
Since then, Japan’s ranking in ODA volume has been declining, and currently it is fifth 
among the DAC countries.(8) This decline in ODA volume coincided with the timing of 
the introduction of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and the advent of the 
aid effectiveness agenda. Although there was not a clear policy or direction on how 
Japan should deal with the new aid agenda, the Japanese government inevitably had to 
face it, as it started to influence the way in which aid was provided at the country level. 
However, compared to the strong political leadership of the UK, the lack of high-level 
commitment in response to the new aid agenda was apparent in Japan. This is not only 
because the aid effectiveness agenda was initiated by the Utstein Group and the 
Like-Minded Group—in other words, introduced from ‘outside’—but also because 
internal political structure matters. In Japan, ODA does not work as a political power 
base during political election campaigns, which might be attributed to Japanese 
citizens’ low level of interest in ODA. Naturally, then, political leadership on aid 
effectiveness is weaker compared to that of the UK, where ODA and aid to Africa are on 
the political agenda. In July 2009, the Democratic Party of Japan and the Conservative 
Party of the UK, which took power after elections in September 2009 and June 2010, 
respectively, published their manifestos. The 64-page-long Conservative Agenda for 
International Development critically analyses the DFID’s approach under the Labour 
Party and proposes alternative measures to ensure the development results of reducing 
the world’s poverty. On the other hand, the description of ODA policy in the manifesto of 
Japan’s Democratic Party is less than half a page long. This contrast shows the 
different backgrounds for the political implications of ODA in the two countries. As 
Lancaster (2010) points out, the reason that Japan did not align its aid more with the 
DAC norms is because there was almost no constituency for ‘development’ aid of the 
kind provided by most DAC member governments.  
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Secondly, in addition to the political leadership, the administrative structure of 
development aid matters. Comparison is often made between the UK’s approach to 
budget support and that of Japan: the UK was proactive in adopting and promoting the 
new aid modality, whereas Japan was cautious in introducing it. This reveals the 
different levels of tolerance for the ‘possibility of failure’ between the two countries’ aid 
administrations. In the Japanese aid administration, officials are strongly concerned 
about the possibility of failure because ODA needs to be accountable to the Japanese 
people, and this is associated with the strict traceability of the ODA funds. However, in 
countries where budget support is more easily introduced, accountability could be 
regarded as more flexible. In addition, while the UK’s aid administration is 
decentralised, which allows for quicker decision making, the decision-making power 
still rests in the central authority of the Japanese aid administration. Also, sectionalism 
among the different departments and ministries in Japan often prevents the 
government from making prompt decisions and deciding on a clear policy direction. It is 
also important to note that Japan’s aid administration is led by the Director General of 
the International Cooperation Bureau within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which 
makes the policy coordination function more difficult compared to the DFID where the 
Minister heads the administration. Administrative capacity should be supplemented by 
political leadership and support from civil society, but the level of understanding of 
development aid in Japan is comparatively low. The history of international 
development has progressed gradually through tremendous efforts of trial and error. 
However, international society is still groping to find the right method of reducing world 
poverty, and, therefore, new approaches may contain risks of failure. If this aspect is not 
understood by the citizens, aid administrations become cautious in introducing new 
approaches because they have to take responsibility for the possible failure as viewed by 
citizens. From this, we can understand that although implementing the Paris 
Declaration requires behavioural change within donor countries, the effort and time 
required for each donor varies because of the different administrative settings. 
 
Third, incentive mechanisms for aid effectiveness are different between the two 
countries. An incentive mechanism is in place in the UK which applies to all levels, from 
the State Secretary and management to general staff in the DFID. The existence of a 
strong political commitment and enabling administrative structure allow individual 
DFID staff to take action in implementing the international agenda smoothly. The 
internalisation of incentives in implementing the Paris Declaration goes to the extent 
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that ‘DFID staff believe that demonstrating commitment to the Paris Declaration 
principles, including alignment, supports their career progression’ (Thornton and Cox 
2008:50). This, however, brings us back to the issue of aid effectiveness going beyond 
the optimum level, which was discussed in the previous section. At the country level, 
when donors have a strong incentive to show their performance against the aid 
effectiveness agenda, they tend to create additional aid coordination meetings and try to 
lead the discussion. Under such circumstances, there is a risk that donors may 
concentrate on achieving the targets set for aid effectiveness and lose sight of the 
ultimate aim, which is ‘development effectiveness’. Too much concentration on aid 
effectiveness may narrow our perspective in achieving the real results of development. 
 
Conversely, incentive for aid effectiveness is weaker in Japan. One of the possible 
reasons for this, apart from the lack of political leadership and weak administration 
structure, is that Japanese aid has been attaching greater importance to changing the 
reality on the ground in terms of supporting development through face-to-face working 
relationships. Not a few Japanese aid officials and experts in the field offices initially 
questioned the necessity of participating in aid coordination and alignment, because 
what was important for them was to spare their time in dealing with the reality in front 
of them (i.e. supporting their counterparts by finding practical solutions) rather than 
attending meetings for policy dialogue. In addition, as Takahashi (2010) analyses, 
because the new aid modality is associated with donors’ deep engagement in the 
domestic affairs of recipient countries, Japan is hesitant towards such engagement 
because of its historical aid experiences with Asian countries. Therefore, even though 
the importance of the aid effectiveness agenda is now recognised, Japan has been of the 
opinion that the ‘mixed approach’ of both project and budget support is necessary in 
order to bridge the downstream practical issues and upstream policy dialogue.  
 
Lastly, it is important to illustrate the struggles that Japan experienced when 
confronting the aid effectiveness agenda. As Ishikawa (2005:34) puts it in his report 
comparing the UK’s ODA and that of Japan, ‘Japan’s aid policy did not pay sufficient 
attention to trends in the international aid community, instead walking the path of 
splendid isolation’. The historical geographical distribution of Japanese aid mainly to 
Asian countries, together with the fact that Japan was one of a few large bilateral 
donors in these counties, may have allowed Japan to walk ‘the path of splendid 
isolation’. In addition, although Arica has been the core focus of international aid 
because of its severe poverty level, Japan’s geographical focus had been on Asia. As 
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Japan started to increase its aid to Africa, and as the aid effectiveness agenda began to 
become mainstreamed in international aid policy, Japan had to face the new agenda. (9) 
 
Accordingly, Japan experienced major disputes in development aid circles on whether 
and how to respond to the aid effectiveness agenda. The proponents’ opinion seemed to 
be that the aid effectiveness agenda came out of the long history of discussions on how 
aid could be effectively provided, and Japan should join and contribute to such an 
important discussion; or, if Japan did not participate in it, it would become difficult to 
continue Japanese aid to Africa, at least in the current way. On the other hand, the 
opponents’ main position could be summarised as follows: the PRSPs, budget support, 
and PBAs were initiated by the Like-Minded countries, and the rationale for Japan to 
participate was not clear. For instance, the opponents were of the opinion that visibility 
of Japan’s ODA might be lost by shifting aid modality from project to budget support; or, 
that budget support might imply that the budgets of developing countries would be 
controlled by allied donors, and there was no consensus that Japan would like to join it; 
or, that the aid effectiveness agenda contained too many risks, as it was unclear how 
that agenda would be linked with the real development results on the ground. In the 
end, the pressures from both outside, such as the signing of the Paris Declaration in an 
international forum, and from the field offices, which experienced the practical 
inconvenience of not having participated in the collective efforts of donors, gradually 
pushed Japan’s effort towards aid effectiveness. As a result, during the early 2000s, 
Japan started to provide budget support as trial cases to a limited number of countries, 
such as Tanzania and Vietnam.(10) In terms of aid administration, in order to increase 
the capacity at the field level, the ODA Task Force, which is mainly composed of 
embassy and Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) staff in the field offices, 
was established in 2003 in order to foster the comprehensive approach of Japanese aid 
at the country level. (11)  
 
 
Suggestions for a way forward  
 
‘Donors are independent actors. We should not expect uniformity of approach. Diversity, 
within and beyond the DAC, is valuable. But if we are to make a reality of a fairer and 
less divided world, donors do need to work together and to learn together’ (Manning 
2008:17). These words clearly address the importance of keeping the right balance 
between uniformity and diversity of donors. The Paris Declaration was agreed upon in 
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order to solve the common problems of development aid by fostering collective actions 
among relevant actors. However, as was shown in the previous section, different donors 
have different motivations and constraints in making efforts for collective action. 
Although it is obvious that there is no way for donors to excuse not having implemented 
the Paris Declaration, which they committed to do, it is also important that we do not 
take it for granted that the followers are easily able to catch up with the frontrunners. 
This is because internal political structures are different from country to country. Again, 
it is the responsibility of the respective donors to carry out necessary reforms by 
changing the internal political structure so that their commitments can be 
implementable; nevertheless, we should be aware of the fact that such changes cannot 
be realised overnight. 
 
Why do we need to maintain diversity while addressing the importance of uniformity? 
Uniformity is, as a matter of course, necessary in order to foster global governance and 
international cooperation, though too much uniformity may create risks of undermining 
what we eventually aim for, which is development effectiveness. Since the late 1990s, 
donors’ aid has been concentrated on the areas which have direct impact on poverty 
reduction, notably the social sectors. This was because there was pressure among 
donors for the aid to Africa, where a large amount of debt was owed, to be in the most 
concessional form (i.e. grants) and to the sectors where the poorest could benefit the 
most (i.e. social sectors). As a result, the share of ODA allocated to the infrastructure 
and production sectors dropped from 53% during the early 1990s to 34% in 2002–2006, 
whereas that of social sectors rose from 36% to 57% during the same period (World 
Bank 2008). Interestingly, in some African countries, where a Division of Labour 
exercise is ongoing as part of the aid effectiveness agenda, the governments are trying 
to reduce the number of donors in the social sectors, where donors are the most 
concentrated, while sectors such as infrastructure are still found to be underfunded. 
(12) When uniformity is pursued among donors, such discrepancies may occur at the 
country level, and this may not be compatible with the diverse realities of developing 
countries, which donors need to confront. In order to maintain the complementarity of 
donors’ aid, diversity must be secured to some extent. (13)  
 
In the previous section, it was discussed that there is no consensus on the ‘optimal level’ 
for harmonisation and alignment. It was also shown that non-DAC donors have 
increasing influence on development aid. These two challenges are in fact associated 
with the issues of uniformity and diversity. In order to grapple with these challenges 
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faced by the aid effectiveness agenda, inclusiveness is crucial. The first step is to expand 
the scope for diversity and decrease the level of uniformity so that the collective efforts 
by DAC donors can be maximised and more non-DAC members can be involved at the 
same time. 
 
Secondly, the aid effectiveness agenda needs to be reflective of the reality on the ground. 
Under the aid effectiveness agenda, it is assumed that the government will deliver 
services to the people, which will lead to successful poverty reduction and development. 
However, the current aid effectiveness agenda is too occupied with upstream 
policy-level dialogue; therefore, the linkage between aid input and development results 
remains unclear. In fact, one of the most serious challenges in developing countries is 
implementing the plans and policies that have already been formulated under 
initiatives such as PRSPs. How can the missing link between policy and service delivery 
be tackled?  
 
Before answering this question, it is important to point out that although the aid 
effectiveness agenda tries to change the donor–recipient relationship by putting 
ownership of the recipient countries and a spirit of partnership at the forefront, which 
can be regarded as unprecedented in the history of international aid, donors are still 
dominant in the aid relationship. One factor behind this is that while the donors are 
promoting aid coordination on the one hand, they are still competitive on the other. The 
focus of aid has shifted from projects in the field to policy dialogue in the capitals, and 
the national visibility of donors has also shifted accordingly: donors’ flags are no longer 
planted on projects but on negotiation tables (Molenaers and Renard 2008). Another 
factor is that now that donors are participating in discussions related to budgetary 
processes in developing countries, such as the Public Expenditure Review, donors’ 
behaviour could progress to the point where they try to persuade the government about 
what they think is right in the budget allocation, which the developing countries may 
find intrusive. Donors’ role should not be to push what they think is right for 
development, but to provide a range of choices from their own perspectives and 
experiences so that developing countries can choose policies which they think are the 
best for their countries. In addition, the policies should be implementable in order to 
bridge the missing link. 
 
More focus should be put on implementation, although the current aid effectiveness 
agenda does not take this into consideration. For instance, the typical reputation of 
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Japanese aid, such as on an infrastructure project, is that once the project plan is 
agreed upon, everything will be implemented according to the plan; therefore, the 
government can be assured that the services will be delivered on the ground within the 
expected timeframe. The other side of this coin is that if Japanese experts are involved 
in the project implementation, their high wages could be susceptible to criticism as they 
do not directly benefit the developing countries, therefore undermining value for 
money.(14) The aid effectiveness agenda promotes the untying of aid by pursuing ‘value 
for money’: when competition is introduced, the cost will be lower. However, even if 
there is value for money in terms of the budget, unless the services are delivered on the 
ground as planned and the delivered products are durable, the value for money will not 
be realised. From this perspective, the ‘quality’ of aid delivery should be dealt with in 
the aid effectiveness agenda. Here, I am not arguing that tied aid should be maintained, 
but rather that we should be cautious of the possibility that there might be cases in 
which the untying of aid undermines the value for money of service delivery at the 
country level. Again, it is important that the scope of the current aid effectiveness 
agenda should be expanded to include ‘outcomes’ so that we do not lose sight of 
development effectiveness. What matters to developing countries is whether the aid is 
properly delivered on the ground and the necessary technology and capacity are 
appropriately transferred to them. 
 
In the end, it is the developing countries that have responsibility for narrowing the gap 
between the existing policy and reality on the ground through successful 
implementation. However, the current aid effectiveness agenda tends to attract 
governments’ attention only at the policy level. Therefore, it is necessary to shift the 
incentives for the government officers in developing countries in a way that allows them 
to deal directly with the people on the ground rather than spending time responding to 
the international aid policy. Aid can play an important role in supporting the 
government in implementing the policies. Naturally, this process will take time, mostly 
through capacity development, but donors need to be patient and not be intrusive in 
supporting the government in implementing their policies.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Under the current practice of the Paris Declaration, donors are still competitive and 
demanding, which undermines the successful reduction of transaction costs imposed on 
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governments in developing countries. The nature of international policy also encourages 
competition among the donors. Furthermore, it is important that new actors in the 
international aid architecture also join the aid effectiveness agenda. However, with the 
increased power that non-DAC donors have been gaining in the global economy, it is 
unrealistic to expect their participation in the aid effectiveness agenda under the 
present conditions. Based on these challenges, this paper proposed revisiting the Paris 
Declaration to create a more inclusive and practical orientation. 
 
As was shown in the comparison between the UK’s approach to aid effectiveness and 
that of Japan, different donors have different motivations and obstacles in 
implementing the aid effectiveness agenda. While pressures from the outside would 
influence the donors’ behaviour, the obstacles are sometimes deeply embedded in the 
internal political structure, and prevent donors from successfully implementing the 
Declaration. Balancing uniformity and diversity is essential when revisiting the aid 
effectiveness agenda and inclusiveness needs to be ensured. On the other hand, the 
motivation for promoting the aid effectiveness agenda may conceivably have led to the 
shift toward upstream policy orientation. Therefore, implementation of the policies 
needs to be taken into consideration and the scope of the aid effectiveness agenda 
should be expanded to include ‘outcomes’. This will lead to link the current gap between 
policy and the reality on the ground. 
 
 
Notes  
(1) PBAs are defined as ‘a way of engaging in development co-operation based on the 
principles of co-ordinated support for a locally owned programme of development’ 
(OECD, 2008).  
(2) Further detailed information on this is available at 
http://www.aideffectiveness.org/Country/Tanzania.html. 
(3) Based on my conversation with one of the management-level government officers in 
Uganda. 
(4) According to Kragelund, non-DAC donors can be categorised as (a) OECD and EU 
members, (b) OECD but not EU members, (c) EU but not OECD members, (d) neither 
EU nor OECD members. [Kragelund, P. (2008) ‘The return of non-DAC donors to Africa: 
New prospects for African development?’, Development Policy Review 26 (5) :555-584] 
However, in this paper, the term refers to (d).  
(5) In 2005–2006, Uganda and Ethiopia experienced severe suspension and reduction of 
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budget support because of human rights and election issues. In 2008, Rwanda 
experienced the same for military issues. 
(6) Two other DFID white papers on international development, ‘Eliminating World 
Poverty: Making Governance Work for the Poor’, and ‘Building Our Common Future’, 
which also reaffirmed the importance of aid effectiveness, were published in 2006 and 
2009, respectively. 
(7) Further information on the Utstein Group can be found at 
http://www.u4.no/projects/utstein/utsteinprinciples.cfm. 
(8) In 2009, the largest five donors by volume were the United States, France, Germany, 
the UK, and Japan. 
(9) Japan’s ODA to Africa increased from US$954 million (11% of total ODA) in 1998 to 
US$1,396 million (20% of total ODA) in 2008. 
(10) Recently, the number of countries to which Japan provides budget support has 
increased. 
(11) Japanese private companies and NGOs sometimes participate in the Task Force. 
(12) A Division of Labour exercise is aimed at restricting the number of donors and 
determining the ‘lead donor’ per sector in developing countries in order to reduce 
transaction costs. 
(13) A 2008 publication by the GRIPS Development Forum, Diversity and 
Complementarity in Development Aid―East Asian Lessons for African Growth, 
http://www.grips.ac.jp/forum-e/D&CinDA.htm)  provides further analysis and case 
studies on the diversity and complementarity of donors. 
(14) In 2008, 84% of Japanese ODA was untied, and another 13% was not reported. 
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Table 1: Comparison of Paris Declaration monitoring indicators for the UK and Japan 
(2005 and 2007) 
Country UK Japan 
Year 2005 2007 Progre
ss  
2005 2007 Progr
ess 
Aid flows are aligned on national 
priorities 
45% 65% +21% 31% 45% +14% 
Strengthen capacity by co-ordinated 
support 
56% 66% +10% 74% 76% +2% 
Use of country public financial 
management systems 
78% 77% –1% 29% 62% +33% 
Use of country procurement systems 78% 68% +10% 26% 61% +35% 
Avoid parallel implementation 
structures (number of parallel PIUs) 
37 18 –19 2 2 0 
Aid is more predictable 46% 60% +14% 32% 48% +16% 
Aid is untied 100
% 
100
% 
0 89% 95% +6% 
Use of common arrangements or 
procedures 
61% 72% +11% 33% 52% +19% 
Joint missions 46% 61% +15% 2% 2% 0% 
Joint analytic work 69% 69% 0 52% 31% –21% 
(Source: OECD, 2008) 
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